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Abstract
This paper develops a method to estimate jointly the degree of (possibly incom-
plete) intertemporal consumption smoothing and the degree of (possibly incomplete)
international/interregional risksharing. This approach generalizes and improves upon
studies that either examine only intertemporal consumption smoothing, or analyze
risksharing by making an extreme assumption on intertemporal consumption smooth-
ing, or by adopting a purely empirical framework. The method is applied to the US
states and OECD and EU countries to analyze how the degrees of risksharing and
intertemporal consumption smoothing diﬀer within a country and across countries.
The empirical results suggest that: 1) regardless of the assumption on the degree
of intertemporal consumption smoothing, the degree of risksharing within a country
is larger than across countries 2) the degree of intertemporal consumption smooth-
ing within a country is also larger than across countries, contrary to the ﬁndings of
past channel studies. Finally, this paper also provides some foundations and suggests
limitations of the empirical literature on channels of risksharing and intertemporal
consumption smoothing.
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Empirical studies on risksharing have grown rapidly in recent years. The formal liter-
ature started by testing the null hypothesis of full risksharing at various aggregation
levels, such as among individuals in a village (Townsend, 1994), among households
(Mace, 1991, Cochrane, 1991, Altug and Miller, 1990, Hayashi, Altonji and Kot-
likoﬀ, 1996), among countries (Canova and Ravn, 1996, Lewis, 1996).1 These seminal
papers, which were essentially based on regressions of consumption on income (and
possibly on other idiosyncratic variables), often controlling for aggregate consump-
tion, originated two strands of macroeconomic literature. One line of research –
ﬁrmly based on theoretical foundations – has allowed for the possibility of incom-
plete risksharing and has focused on its precise measurement (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994,
Crucini, 1999, Athanasoulis and van Wincoop, 2001, Crucini and Hess, 2000). These
studies usually focus on the degree of risksharing across regions (mutual insurance
across states of nature against idiosyncratic regional risks, ex ante), but many of
them pay less attention to the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing of the
region (diversiﬁcation of idiosyncratic consumption changes across time, ex post). For
example, Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) have performed estimations of the
degree of risksharing, assuming away intertemporal consumption smoothing. Other
studies have assumed an extreme degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing,
either by taking the permanent income hypothesis to hold fully (Crucini, 1999 and
Crucini and Hess, 2000), or by postulating no intertemporal consumption smoothing
altogether (Obstfeld, 1994, 1995).
A second line of work has concentrated on measuring the contribution to riskshar-
ing – possibly incomplete – of various risksharing channels (Asdrubali, Sørensen and
Yosha, 1996, Del Negro, 1998, Sørensen and Yosha, 1998, M´ elitz and Zumer, 1999,
Dedola, Usai and Vannini, 1999, Asdrubali and Kim, 2004.) An important contribu-
tion of these papers has been the distinction between risksharing and intertemporal
smoothing. However, by adopting a purely empirical framework, these analyses have
not provided explicit theoretical underpinnings to their empirical estimations. In ad-
dition, these studies require data on several income measures, one after each stage of
risksharing or intertemporal consumption smoothing; yet such data might be unavail-
able.2
This paper links together these two major strands of the empirical risksharing
literature, by developing a method that jointly estimates the (possibly incomplete)
degree of risksharing and the (possibly incomplete) degree of intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing, and that is consistent with risksharing and intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing theory. The paper also identiﬁes the major econometric diﬀerences
between the two approaches, and provides rationales for either choice. Like many
other papers of both lines of research, we apply our method to three regions – the
US states, the OECD countries, and the EU members – in order to provide a possi-
ble rationalization for the failure of the full risksharing hypothesis by comparing intra
1Informal tests of full risksharing using cross-country income and consumption correlations were
pioneered by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), and spurred a vast ”cross-correlations” literature.
2Refer to the discussion in Sections 2 and 3.
1vs. international risksharing and intertemporal consumption smoothing, and to shed
a light on the cost of the European monetary uniﬁcation process.
Our methodology also improves upon each line of research. As for the former
strand of the literature, a method of estimating the degree of risksharing without pay-
ing much attention to the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing is likely to
be biased, since the two mechanisms are inter-related and the estimate of the degree
of risksharing may depend on the assumption on the degree of intertemporal smooth-
ing. Second, by paying attention to intertemporal consumption smoothing as well as
to risksharing we contribute to the clariﬁcation of such practical issues as the costs
of a monetary union. In a monetary union, not only does the role of automatic stabi-
lization mechanisms – such as risksharing ex ante through portfolio diversiﬁcation or
via ﬁscal stabilizers – but also of intertemporal consumption smoothing mechanisms
– like international lending and borrowing – become crucial; hence their precise
measurement bears paramount implications for the design of EU institutions. Assum-
ing an extreme degree of intertemporal smoothing thus obscures the true costs and
beneﬁts of monetary uniﬁcation. As for the latter strand of the literature, we pro-
vide a theoretical foundation of studies on channels of risksharing and consumption
smoothing (e.g., Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha, 1996, Sørensen and Yosha, 1998,
and M´ elitz and Zumer, 1999), which – albeit widely recognized as a useful ﬁrst cut
to smoothing measurement – have not as yet been based on explicit links to theory.
We suggest some theoretical limitations encountered by those studies and we further
propose an empirical method that does not necessarily require data on national or
disposable income (that is, income after risksharing), which is useful if such data is
not available or has a poor quality.
Finally, there is much work that focuses on intertemporal consumption smoothing,
for example, Hall (1978), Campbell and Deaton (1989), Campbell and Mankiw (1990),
Deaton (1992), and Østergaard, Sørensen, and Yosha (2002). Among them, just few
recent studies such as Sørensen and Yosha (2000) and Bayoumi and Klein (1997) have
investigated the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing within a country vs.
across countries. From the viewpoint of these analyses, we develop a method to
estimate the degree of risksharing, as a complement to the degree of intertemporal
consumption smoothing.
The test of intertemporal consumption smoothing and the test of risksharing often
involve a similar set of variables, for example, consumption as a dependent variable
and income as an independent variable. As a result, it is likely that estimating one side
often turns out to be actually estimating the other side also. For example, sometimes
a study intends to estimate the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing, but
the estimate may reﬂect in part the degree of risksharing.3 This study oﬀers one way
to disentangle intertemporal consumption smoothing from risksharing in a uniﬁed
framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a method to esti-
mate the degree of risksharing and the degree of intertemporal consumption smooth-
3For example, as argued by Sørensen and Yosha (2000), Bayoumi and Klein (1997) intended to
estimate the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing only, but they ended up with a measure
of the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing and risksharing combined.
2ing. Section 3 extends the framework to provide a connection with the channel liter-
ature. Section 4 reports the estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a
summary of ﬁndings.
2. Incomplete Risk Sharing and Incomplete Intertemporal Con-
sumption Smoothing
Since risksharing is arranged ex-ante while consumption is intertemporally smoothed
ex-post, we ﬁrst model risksharing arrangements, a n dt h e nm o d e li n t e r t e m p o r a lc o n -
sumption smoothing on top of the risksharing arrangements. Consider possibly in-
complete risksharing among J countries in an international organization, that to ﬁx
ideas we will call EU (or among J regions in a country, which we will call the US).4 As
in Crucini’s (1999) model, we posit that each country j sells a fraction λ of its income
stream Yj in exchange for a claim to the pooled income streams of all J countries,
so that λ can be naturally interpreted as the degree of risk sharing achieved by the
country.
The average date t amount in the pool of the EU is Yt ≡ 1
J
PJ
j=1 Yjt.T h eﬂow
of domestic income after risk pooling is
Y jt ≡ λYt +( 1− λ)Yjt. (2.1)
Domestic income after risksharing (or ”disposable income”) is equal to its own income
stream when λ is 0 (no risksharing), and to the income stream of the pool when λ
is 1 (full risksharing).5 When λ is between 0 and 1 (partial risksharing), a country’s
disposable income is a weighted average of its own income stream and of the income
stream of the pool.6
While complete risksharing implies full intertemporal consumption smoothing –
in the sense that an Euler equation for intertemporal consumption allocation is satis-
ﬁed – on the contrary partial risksharing does not necessarily imply full intertemporal
consumption smoothing. Therefore, we will consider possibly incomplete intertem-
poral consumption smoothing of each country j. When consumption is perfectly
smoothed intertemporally, the country consumes its permanent (disposable) income.7
When consumption is not smoothed intertemporally at all, the country consumes its
current (disposable) income. We deﬁne γ, the degree of intertemporal consumption
smoothing achieved by the country, as the fraction of its permanent disposable income
used to smooth its consumption. When a fraction, γ, of its permanent disposable in-
come is used to smooth its consumption (and hence the remaining fraction 1 − γ is
4For simplicity, we follow the standard practice of assuming that all countries in the EU (or all
regions in the US) are identical ex ante.
5In this section, we do not separate risksharing achieved by private and public sectors, but we
will do it in section 3.
6Risksharing may be incomplete if markets are incomplete, if transaction costs in the goods
markets are non-negligible, if contracts are costly to enforce or informational asymmetries exist that
induce moral hazard.
7We assume that each country smooths consumption by borrowing or lending at a possibly dif-
ferent but constant exogenous real interest rate.
3consumed out of its current disposable income), the change in consumption of country
j is
4Cjt = µj +( 1− γ)4Y jt + γεjt (2.2)
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is the change in consumers’ es-
timate of their permanent (disposable) income from t − 1t ot, which we will call
the innovation in permanent (disposable) income. The consumption change is equal
to the current disposable income change when γ is 0 (no intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing), and to the innovation in permanent disposable income when γ is 1
(full intertemporal consumption smoothing). When γ i sb e t w e e n0a n d1( p a r t i a li n -
tertemporal consumption smoothing), a country’s consumption change is a weighted
average of its current disposable income change and the innovation in permanent
disposable income.8 Observe that, in characterizing incomplete intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing, equation (2.2) allows for both excess sensitivity of consumption
and excess smoothness, as well as ”rule of thumb” behavior, as documented by Flavin
(1981), Campbell and Deaton (1989) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990), respec-
tively. The change in the consumption average of all countries leads to the expression






4Cjt = µ +( 1− γ)4Yt + γεt (2.3)
where µ ≡ 1
J
PJ




Using equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), the change in country consumption becomes
4Cjt = e µ + λ4Ct +( 1− γ)(1− λ)4Yjt + ηjt (2.4)
where the intercept e µ ≡ µj − λµ, the error ηjt ≡ γ (εjt − λεt)=γ (1 − λ)εjt and the
innovation εjt ≡ (1 − β)
P∞
k=0 β
k [EtYjt+k − Et−1Yjt+k] .T h ec h a n g ei nc o u n t r yc o n -
sumption is a weighted average of the changes in aggregate consumption, the changes
in domestic income, and the innovation in permanent income. λ shows the degree of
international risksharing while γ indicates the degree of intertemporal consumption
smoothing of the country. As λ goes to 1, the change in country consumption is closer
to the change in aggregate consumption and risksharing is larger. As γ g o e st o1w h e n
λ is less than 1, the change in country consumption depends more on the innovations
in its permanent income and intertemporal consumption smoothing is larger. When λ
and γ both go to 0, the consumption change is closer to the change in current domestic
8Intertemporal consumption smoothing can be incomplete, and the permanent income hypothesis
may not hold, due to market imperfections, such as liquidity constraints. Other reasons why the
permanent income hypothesis may not hold include a rate of impatience diﬀerent from the gross
real interest rate, the existence of precautionary savings, changing real interest rates (Michener
1984), home production (Baxter and Jermann 1999), non-additive utility and consumption-leisure
non-separabilities (Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers 1985).
4income, which implies that both risk sharing and consumption smoothing are closer
to null. Observe that full risksharing (λ = 1) implies that intertemporal consumption
smoothing is automatically achieved in the sense that the Euler condition is satisﬁed
regardless of the value of γ;9 consequently, γ does not show up in (2.4) when λ =1
(because the third term disappears). On the contrary, full intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing (γ = 1) does not imply that risksharing is automatically achieved,
in the sense that country consumption is not necessarily proportional to aggregate
consumption; this is why λ still shows up in (2.4) when γ = 1 (the second term).
Taking account of this asymmetry between risksharing and intertemporal smoothing
is a value added of our formulation.
Since income and consumption series do not follow exactly linear homoskedastic
processes, an empirical test of an equation like (2.4) – which is cast in level-diﬀerences
– is not entirely appropriate. Thus we follow the literature in taking the log approx-
imation of the equation, along the lines suggested by Campbell and Mankiw (1989,
1990), Obstfeld (1994) and Crucini (1999), so that our results will be comparable
with theirs. Hence our estimating relation will be
4cjt = e µ + λ4ct +( 1− γ)(1− λ)4yjt + ujt (2.5)
where lowercase letters indicate logs. The above formulation represents not only a par-
simonious way of jointly characterizing partial risksharing and partial intertemporal
smoothing. It is also quite general, in the sense that it can be derived in a full-ﬂedged
model as an approximation either from a standard quadratic utility function, or from
an isoelastic utility function with log-normally distributed consumption.10
Equation (2.5) can be viewed as an advanced form of risksharing test that allows
partial intertemporal consumption smoothing. In this sense, it encompasses previ-
ous studies on both risksharing and intertemporal consumption smoothing as special
cases. Obstfeld (1994, 1995) examined a variant of the γ = 0 case (no intertemporal
consumption smoothing), by including the change in current income as a regressor
without considering the innovations in permanent income. Obstfeld (1994) estimated
the following type of equation:
4cjt = α + α14ct + α24yjt + ejt (2.6)
Note that by assuming γ = 0 (no intertemporal consumption smoothing), equation
(2.5) reduces to the following equation.
4cjt = e µ + λ4ct +( 1− λ)4yjt (2.7)
which is the same as (2.6) with the additional condition α1+ α2 =1 . 11. Therefore,
Obstfeld (1994) essentially assumed no intertemporal consumption smoothing.
9See, for example, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) for a formal proof.
10See Kimball (2003) for a defense of the certainty equivalence approximation to uncertainty.
11ejt can be interpreted as a country-speciﬁc preference shocks.
5On the other hand, Crucini (1999) and Crucini and Hess (2000) examined the case
of γ = 1 (perfect intertemporal consumption smoothing) by including the innovation
in permanent income without considering the change in current income. Crucini
(1999) estimated the following type of equation:
4cjt = α14ct +( 1− α1)4yP
jt + ejt (2.8)
where 4yP
jt (= εjt) is the innovation in permanent income. Note that equation (2.5)
reduces to this equation by assuming γ =1( a n de µ = 0). By assuming and estimating
various stochastic processes for yjt, Crucini (1999) constructs yP
jt, and then estimates
equation (2.8) by OLS.
If yjt follows a random walk so that 4yjt = νjt where νjt is i.i.d., then all meth-
ods are similar (when estimating the degree of risksharing) since permanent income
changes and current income changes are equal and it does not matter whether we use
the former, the latter or a weighted average of the two as regressors. Speciﬁcally, all
equations reduce to12
4cjt = α + α14ct +( 1− α1)4yjt + ejt. (2.9)
In this case, it becomes diﬃcult to empirically distinguish an economy with full in-
tertemporal smoothing from an economy with no intertemporal smoothing. However,
realistically, yjt may follow a more general process. First, changes in domestic income
may depend on its own past changes. In fact, several studies, such as Campbell and
Mankiw (1990), Campbell and Deaton (1989), and Deaton (1992), suggested that
income changes do depend on past income changes. In this regard, we estimate the
auto-correlation of yjt f o re a c hs t a t ei nt h eU Sa n df o re a c hc o u n t r yi nt h eO E C D
and EU. The average of the estimated auto-correlation of income is 0.31 for the US
states, 0.29 for OECD countries, and 0.30 for EU members; the dependence is not
trivial. Second, changes in domestic income may be aﬀected by other variables, like
changes in aggregate income.
As an illustration, let us assume an AR-1 process for domestic income changes,
that is, 4yjt = ρ4yjt−1+νjt, where 0 < ρ < 1, and examine how equations (2.5) and
(2.8) diverge. Under the assumed income process, ∆yP
jt = εjt = 1
1−ρ4yjt; therefore,
equation (2.5) becomes







Thus assuming full intertemporal consumption smoothing (γ = 1) as in Crucini (1999)
and Crucini and Hess (2000) is likely to provide a diﬀerent estimate of λ than our
model allowing for partial intertemporal consumption smoothing (that is, without re-
stricting the value of γ to 1). Notice that our speciﬁcation remains the same, regardless
of the stochastic process followed by domestic income.
12The condition α1+ α2 = 1 is additionally needed for equation (2.6). Equations (2.5) and (2.8)
are obtained by respectively imposing ejt =0a n dα = 0 in (2.9).
6At this point, it is easy to show that our model also embeds the baseline speciﬁ-
cation of intertemporal consumption smoothing in Campbell and Mankiw (1990) as
a special case. Their model
4cjt = µj +( 1− γ)4yjt + γεjt (2.11)
correctly uses disposable income as a regressor, but it is silent on its determinants. In
other words, it assumes risksharing away, and thus corresponds to our speciﬁcation
(2.2).
Equation (2.5) can be estimated by an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The
error term ujt, a function of the innovations in permanent income, is orthogonal to
lagged variables but not necessarily to current independent variables such as 4yjt
and 4ct. The change in domestic income, 4yjt, is likely to be correlated to ujt when
the changes in domestic income are persistent. The change in aggregate consumption,
4ct may be correlated with ujt; both aggregate consumption and domestic permanent
income are likely to be correlated with aggregate permanent income.
We use lagged values of 4yjt, 4yt, 4cjt, 4ct, a sw e l la so fm e a s u r e so fc o u n t r y
savings sjt and aggregate savings st – as instruments. Own lagged variables are
good predictors. In addition, as Campbell (1987) and Campbell and Mankiw (1990)
suggested, the history of consumption may be a good predictor for income, and income
and consumption may be cointegrated. Therefore, we use lagged values of 4cjt and
sjt. On the other hand, since lagged income and saving may be good predictors for
consumption, lagged values of 4yt and st are also used. We include at least the
second and the third lags of the instruments, but avoid using the ﬁrst lags to guard
against time aggregaton bias. Following Crucini (1999), the model is estimated for
each region, and the averages of the point estimates and their standard errors are
reported; a pooled regression would give a near zero estimate of the coeﬃcient on the
aggregate consumption since the aggregate consumption (or the average consumption)
is regressed on individual consumption. In each estimation, the values of λ and γ are
restricted to be no larger than 1 and no smaller than 0.13
3. Alternative Method and Connections to the Channels Liter-
ature
The previous section shows a useful way to estimate the degree of risksharing and
intertemporal consumption smoothing jointly when data on only domestic (before-
risksharing) income and consumption are available. In this section, we discuss an
alternative procedure to jointly estimate the degree of risksharing and intertempo-
ral consumption smoothing when data on additional measures of income is available.
We will take advantage of data on domestic income (e.g., GDP), national income
(e.g., GNI) and disposable income (e.g., GDI), in order to measure income before
13In very few cases, we found implausibly large and small values that change the average dramat-
ically, so we restrict the values of λ and γ. We also experimented by restricting the values between
-1 and 2, but the results are not much diﬀerent.
7risksharing, income after private risksharing (through ﬁnancial markets), and income
after both private and public risksharing (through ﬁnancial markets and ﬁscal sta-
bilization), respectively.14 We thus connect our method to studies on channels of
risksharing and consumption smoothing, like Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996)
and Sørensen and Yosha (1998), that exploited such types of data.
From equation (2.1),
(4Yjt − 4Yt) −
¡
4Y jt − 4Yt
¢
= λ(4Yjt − 4Yt). (3.1)
By using equations (2.2) and (2.3),
¡
4Y jt − 4Yt
¢
− (4Cjt − 4Ct)=γ
¡
4Y jt − 4Yt
¢
− ηjt. (3.2)
where ηjt = γ (εjt − εt)=γ (1 − λ)(εjt − εt). Therefore, if data on disposable in-
come (Y jt) is available, λ and γ can be gauged by estimating equations (3.1) and
(3.2). Equations (3.1) and (3.2) can be estimated by an OLS and an IV approach,
respectively.
In addition to the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing, studies such as
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998), and Athanasoulis
and van Wincoop (2001) analyzed the role of two risksharing channels – ﬁnancial
diversiﬁcation and ﬁscal stabilizers – by constructing a measure of income after
only capital market risksharing (by using net factor income data) and a measure of
income after both types of risksharing or disposable income (by using government
net transfers data). The current framework can be extended to multiple channels of
risksharing if data on various measures of income are available.
Assume that λ = λ1 + λ2,w h e r eλ1 is the degree of risksharing achieved by the
ﬁnancial market and λ2 is the degree of risksharing achieved by ﬁscal policy. Then,
the ﬂow of disposable income is
Y jt ≡ (λ1 + λ2)Yt +( 1− λ1 − λ2)Yjt. (3.3)
We can also deﬁne the ﬂow of national income as
e Yjt ≡ λ1Yt +( 1− λ1)Yjt. (3.4)
From the above two equations,
Y jt ≡ e Yjt + λ2 (Yt − Yjt). (3.5)
14National income is a good measure of income after private risksharing because it includes net
factor income ﬂows, that is, rent, dividend, interest and wage payments accruing to people who
have diversiﬁed abroad their ﬁnancial and human portfolios. In turn, disposable income is a good
measure of income after both private and public risksharing because it adds to national income the
net current transfers received from abroad, typically composed of ﬁscal funds. For further details,
see Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) for a discussion of regional measures and Sørensen and
Yosha (1998) for national measures.
8Then, from equations (3.4) and (3.5),
(4Yjt − 4Yt) −
³
4e Yjt − 4Yt
´
= λ1 (4Yjt − 4Yt) (3.6)
³




4Y jt − 4Yt
¢
= λ2 (4Yjt − 4Yt)
Therefore, channels of risksharing can be estimated sequentially, as in Asdrubali,
Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) or Sørensen and Yosha (1998).
Now we compare the current method to that in Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha
(1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998). They estimated the following equation system,
in logs.
4yjt − 4e yjt = α1,t + β14yjt + e1,jt (3.7)
4e yjt − 4yjt = α2,t + β24yjt + e2,jt
4yjt − 4cjt = α3,t + β34yjt + e3,jt
4cjt = α4,t + β44yjt + e4,jt.
where α.,t is a time ﬁxed eﬀect. Then, they interpreted β1and β2 as the degree of
risksharing provided by ﬁnancial markets and by ﬁscal stabilization, and β3 as the
degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Our corresponding system of equations (from (3.6) and (3.2)) in log approximation
is:
(4yjt − 4yt) − (4e yjt − 4yt)=λ1 (4yjt − 4yt) (3.8)














4yjt − 4e yjt = −λ14yt + λ14yjt (3.9)
4e yjt − 4yjt = −λ24yt + λ24yjt
4yjt − 4cjt =( 1 − γ)4yt − 4ct + γ4yjt − ηjt
= −γ4yt + γ4yjt − ηjt, if 4yt = 4ct
where ηjt = γ (εjt − εt)=γ (1 − λ)(εjt − εt).
By comparing equations (3.7) with equations (3.8) or equations (3.9), we can see
that the procedure to estimate the degree of risksharing is very similar.15 The main
15The aggregate income change in equations (3.9), can be captured with the time-ﬁxed eﬀect in
equations (3.7). In fact, Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) stated that the time ﬁxed eﬀect is
introduced to control the aggregate eﬀect.
9diﬀerence comes from the procedure to estimate the degree of intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing. First, in past studies 4yjt is used as a regressor, whereas 4yjt is
used as a regressor in the current setup. Intuitively, consumers smooth consumption
given disposable income, rather than given domestic income. Therefore, past studies’
estimates of β3 can be regarded as the correct estimate of the degree of intertemporal
consumption smoothing only if risksharing is null (λ = 0). To infer how the results
w o u l db eb i a s e di fw eu s e dd o m e s t i ci n c o m ei nstead of disposable income, we further
modify the third equation in (3.9) by using equation (2.1).
4yjt − 4cjt =( 1 − γ + γλ)4yt − 4ct + γ (1 − λ)4yjt − ηit (3.10)
=( −γ + γλ)4yt + γ (1 − λ)4yjt − ηit, if 4yt = 4ct.
The above equation suggests that the results would be biased downward if there was
non-zero risksharing; the more risksharing there is, the larger the downward bias.
Second, in the current set up, IV estimation may be more appropriate since the error
terms may be correlated with the regressor. In other words, past studies did not allow
for the possibility that consumption might depend on permanent income or for the
possibility that current income might be diﬀerent from permanent income.16
We estimate equations (3.8) by running a pooled regression. The ﬁrst two equa-
tions are estimated by OLS while the last equation is estimated by IV methods. As
instruments, we use own lagged variables, lagged values of 4cjt −4ct, lagged values




jt = e yjt−cjt). We include at least the second and the third lags of the instruments.
The two methods of estimating the degree of risksharing and the degree of in-
tertemporal consumption smoothing are complementary. The single equation method,
represented by equation (2.5), can be implemented without data on national or dis-
posable income, but might be subject to a multi-collinearity problem (if 4ct and 4yjt
are correlated). In addition, if aggregate domestic income shocks generate a positive
comovement of aggregate income and individual income, individual consumption and
aggregate consumption can be correlated and λ can be positive even without any
risksharing. On the other hand, the channel method, represented by equations (3.8),
can avoid the multi-collinearity issue but is problematic in the absence or poor quality
of data on national and disposable income.
4. Empirical Results
We estimate both models by using data for 50 US states (1963-1990, annual data)
and 22 OECD and 15 EU countries (1960-1990, annual data).17 For data sources
and details on data construction, refer to Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) and
Asdrubali and Kim (2004).
16On the other hand, channels studies were typically based on an accounting identity that yielded
parsimonious restrictions, very useful as a ﬁrst approximation to a decomposition of smoothing
channels.
17OECD data are limited to 1990 to avoid issues related to the German uniﬁcation structural
break.
10Region Instruments e µ γ λ γ = 1 γ = 0 λ = 1 λ = 0
US 2,3 lags -0.02 (0.10) 0.41 (0.23) 0.53 (0.18) 10 23 10 11
US 2,3 lags 0.45 (0.27) 0.65 (0.17) 16 14 14 1
US 2-4 lags -0.05 (0.42) 0.40 (0.25) 0.63 (0.19) 10 17 11 5
US 2-4 lags 0.34 (0.20) 0.64 (0.18) 9 21 9 1
US 2-5 lags 0.02 (0.21) 0.36 (0.21) 0.62 (0.22) 10 18 7 2
US 2-5 lags 0.32 (0.20) 0.64 (0.19) 9 22 8 0
OECD 2,3 lags 0.003(.010) 0.17 (0.08) 0.51 (0.15) 0 12 2 1
OECD 2,3 lags 0.16 (0.15) 0.50 (0.12) 1 7 2 0
OECD 2-4 lags 0.004(.008) 0.22 (0.10) 0.46 (0.15) 1 10 1 0
OECD 2-4 lags 0.11 (0.08) 0.46 (0.10) 0 9 2 0
OECD 2-5 lags 0.006(.005) 0.21 (0.13) 0.38 (0.15) 0 6 1 1
OECD 2-5 lags 0.10 (0.07) 0.45 (0.10) 0 9 1 0
EU 2,3 lags -0.004 (0.024) 0.21 (0.12) 0.58 (0.12) 1 7 2 1
EU 2,3 lags 0.13 (0.09) 0.51 (0.13) 1 7 0 0
EU 2-4 lags 0.006 (0.007) 0.19 (0.13) 0.43 (0.16) 0 6 1 1
EU 2-4 lags 0.16 (0.07) 0.53 (0.10) 0 7 1 0
EU 2-5 lags 0.004 (0.006) 0.19 (0.09) 0.41 (0.12) 0 6 2 0
EU 2-5 lags 0.15 (0.10) 0.52 (0.09) 0 5 2 0
Table 4.1: Model 1 (single equation method, equation (2.5)). IV estimates of the
degree of intertemporal smoothing γ (column 4), the degree of risksharing λ (column
5), the intercept e µ (column 3), with number of lags of the instruments in column 2.
Also reported are estimates when e µ = 0. Last four columns indicate the number of
times the restrictions γ =1 ,γ =0 ,λ =1 ,λ = 0 are binding, respectively.
4.1. Single-equation method
Table 4.1 shows the results of the single equation method, estimating equation (2.5).
We report the results of using 2-3 lags, 2-4 lags, and 2-5 lags of the instruments (for
saving, only the second lag is used in all cases) in Table 4.1. Since the constant term,
e µ, often turns out to be statistically insigniﬁcant, we also estimate the model by
assuming e µ = 0. The table also reports the number of cases that the restrictions on
γ and λ are binding.
The ﬁrst noteworthy result is that the degree of risksharing is higher among the
US states than across the OECD countries; the estimated λ is 0.53—0.65 for US states
but 0.38—0.51 for the OECD countries and 0.41—0.58 for the EU countries. This result
is consistent with studies that found a higher degree of risksharing within a country
than across countries, such as Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Asdrubali and Kim (2004),
Crucini and Hess (2000), and Crucini (1999).
Second, the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing is also higher in the
US states than in the OECD and EU countries; the estimated γ is 0.32—0.45 for the
US but 0.10—0.22 for the OECD and 0.13—0.21 for the EU.
To compare our method to those used by others, we estimate equation (2.7) (”Ob-
11Obstfeld Crucini, RW Crucini, AR-1 General, AR-1
US 0.74 (0.21) 0.73 (0.20) 0.86 (0.12) 0.77 (0.11)
OECD 0.52 (0.14) 0.49 (0.14) 0.69 (0.10) 0.54 (0.08)
EU 0.52 (0.15) 0.49 (0.15) 0.69 (0.10) 0.54 (0.10)
Table 4.2: Model 2 (single equation methods, equations (2.7), (2.9) with α = 0, (2.10)
with γ = 1, and (2.10) with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1): comparison of λ estimates
stfeld”), equation (2.7) with e µ = 0 or equation (”Crucini, RW”), equation (”Crucini,
AR-1”), and equation (”General, AR-1”). For the last two estimations, we ﬁrst esti-
mate ρ, then use the estimate in the main regression. Table 4.2 reports the estimate
for λ in each case.
The method assuming no intertemporal consumption smoothing (”Obstfeld” or
”Crucini, RW”) tends to give a higher estimate of λ for both, and more for the US state
case. The method assuming full intertemporal consumption smoothing (”Crucini,
RW” and ”Crucini, AR-1”) also gives a higher estimate for both. The method allowing
possibility of partial intertemporal consumption smoothing under the assumption that
domestic income follows an AR-1 process (”General, AR-1”) also provides a higher
estimate of λ for both, and slightly more for the US state case. Overall, all these
m e t h o d ss u g g e s tt h a tt h ed e g r e eo fr i s k s haring in the US states is larger than in
the OECD (EU) countries. That is, although diﬀerent assumptions on the degree
of intertemporal consumption smoothing yield diﬀerent estimates of λ,t h er e l a t i v e
ranking of the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing within the US states
and within the OECD (and EU) countries is the same.
4.2. Channels method
Table 4.3 reports the results of the channels method, which we apply by estimating
equations (3.8). As documented by other channel studies, we ﬁnd that the extent
of risksharing is far larger in the US states than in the OECD and EU countries.
Interestingly, the estimated value of γ is 0.64—0.78 for the US states, but only 0.57—
0.61 for OECD countries and 0.30—0.46 for EU countries, which implies that the
degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing is larger in the US states than in
the OECD and in the EU countries, consistently with the results of our previous
regression. However, this result is diﬀerent from past channel studies that report a
higher degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing in the OECD or EU countries
than in the US states (Sørensen and Yosha, 1998 and Asdrubali and Kim, 2004), while
it agrees with other studies (such as Sørensen and Yosha, 2000) that use consumption
regressions developed by Hall (1978), Campbell and Deaton (1989), Deaton (1992),
Østergaard, Sørensen, and Yosha (2002).
One reason that other channel studies often found the opposite result might lie
in their use of domestic income (GDP), instead of disposable income (GDI), as a
regressor, although consumers should smooth consumption intertemporally based on
the latter. A high degree of risksharing within a country would bias the estimated
degree of intertemporal smoothing signiﬁcantly downward, driving to a conclusion
12λ1 λ2 γ, 2,3 lags γ,2 - 4l a g s γ,2 - 5l a g s
US 0.41 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01) 1.04 (0.29) 1.17 (0.23) 0.98 (0.20)
OECD 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.27 (0.20) 0.23 (0.19) 0.15 (0.18)
EU 0.05 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.86 (0.25) 0.47 (0.18) 0.40 (0.16)
Table 4.3: Model 3 (channels method, equations (3.8)). Estimates of risksharing
through portfolio diversiﬁcation λ1 (column 2), risksharing through ﬁscal stabilizers
λ2 (column 3), intertemporal consumption smoothing γ (columns 4, 5, 6)
4yjt 4yjt
US 0.30 (0.03) 0.64 (0.04)
OECD 0.43 (0.03) 0.53 (0.02)
EU 0.42 (0.04) 0.55 (0.03)
Table 4.4: Model 4 (channels models, third equation in (3.8)): comparison of OLS
estimates of γ when regressor is 4yjt (GDP) (column 2) and 4yjt (GDI) (column 3)
that the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing within a country is low.
Another reason for the discrepancy might be that other channel studies considered
only current income changes, even though intertemporal consumption smoothing is
related to permanent income changes that are often diﬀerent from current income
changes.18
To explore the issue, we run some pooled OLS regressions that modify the third
equation in (3.8), and report the results in Table 4.4. The second and the third
columns report the pooled OLS estimate of γ when the regressor is 4yjt (GDP) and
4yjt (GDI), respectively. When the instrument is not used and GDP is adopted as a
regressor, the γ estimate is higher for OECD (EU) countries than for US states. When
the regressor changes to GDI, the γ estimate for US states becomes far larger, and the
opposite result is found: the γ estimate is lower for OECD (EU) countries than for
US states. These results are consistent with the above conjecture that using domestic
income may cause the signiﬁcant downward bias in the U.S. estimate. On the other
hand, using disposable income, without considering permanent income by estimating
the equation by OLS, still yields a diﬀerent estimate for each case. This result is
consistent with the other point we have made that permanent income changes are
relevant for intertemporal consumption smoothing but may be diﬀerent from current
income changes.
An interesting econometric issue arises from the fact that the exact estimates of γ
and λ tend to be diﬀerent for the two empirical methods (the single equation method,
estimating equation (2.5) and the channel method, estimating equations (3.8); the
estimate of λ is higher but the estimate of γ is lower in the former than in the latter.
Aggregate income shocks may generate a positive comovement of country and aggre-
gate consumption even without risksharing, which implies that λ may be positively
18Del Negro (1998) and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2001) are exceptions.
13Region instruments b λ
US 2-4 lags 0.47 (0.16)
US 2-5 lags 0.48 (0.17)
OECD 2-4 lags 0.40 (0.11)
OECD 2-5 lags 0.33 (0.13)
EU 2-4 lags 0.39 (0.10)
EU 2-5 lags 0.33 (0.11)
Table 4.5: Model 5 (single equation method, equation (4.1)): test of the role of
aggregate shocks by estimation of b λ
biased in the former.19 On the other hand, the problem of the data on disposable
income, in particular, omissions of some risksharing income ﬂows, may generate a
negatively biased estimate of λ in the latter. Further, given consumption and income
movements, an underestimated role of risksharing would imply an overestimated role
of intertemporal consumption smoothing, that is, a positively biased estimate of γ in
the latter.20 Despite these possible problems, both methods converge on the relative
degree of risksharing and intertemporal consumption smoothing for the intra vs. the
international dimension: the degree of risksharing and the degree of intertemporal
consumption smoothing are higher within countries than across countries.
To further explore whether a possible comovement of country and aggregate con-
sumption due to aggregate shocks (and possibly multi-collinearity problems) leads to
as i g n i ﬁcantly biased estimate of λ in the single equation method, we estimate the
following equation.
4cjt = µ∗ + b λ4b ct + b γ4yjt + ηjt. (4.1)
where b ct is the estimated residual in the regression: 4ct = a + b4yjt + ejt.T h a t
is, we replace aggregate consumption changes with aggregate consumption changes
that are not correlated to changes in individual income. In this way, we exclude the
correlation between 4ct and 4yjt – including the correlation generated by aggregate
income shocks – in estimating the degree of risksharing (b λ). In addition, the multi-
collinearity problem disappears. We report the estimate in Table 4.5.21
The results from this modiﬁcation to the single equation estimation method still
show that the degree of risksharing is higher in the US than in the OECD (and
EU). The estimated b λ’s tend to be lower than the estimated λ’s in the original single
equation method but still quite high. Especially, the estimated b λ’s for OECD and EU
19We do not ﬁnd any typical symptom of multi-collinearity problems in the results of the ﬁrst
method.
20Such a bias is likely to be more severe in the case of international data; international data on
capital market smoothing (using the diﬀerence between GNI and GDP) does not include capital gains
and losses on net foreign assets. To be consistent, the discrepancy is more severe for the OECD and
EU estimates.
21The same set of instruments as in the original regression is used except for replacing c with b c
and changing the deﬁnition of aggregate saving correspondingly.
14countries (that is, for international data) are still quite higher than the estimated λ’s
in the channel method. This result may suggest that aggregate shocks (and possible
multi-collinearity problems) in the single equation method may not be very serious,
and that the inaccuracy of the international data in the channel method may be a
more important reason for the discrepancy between the estimates of the two methods.
5. Conclusion
Models of consumption smoothing in open economies have typically assumed two
extreme international ﬁnancial structures: the ”bonds only” and the ”complete mar-
kets” framework (see Baxter and Crucini, 1995 and Baxter, 1995 for a comparison
of the two modeling strategies in business cycle studies). In the former, only ex post
international borrowing and lending is available to smooth consumption, whereas,
in the latter, complete markets in contingent claims allow for consumption buﬀer-
ing through full risksharing of income shocks. Since the evidence seemed to point
away from full risksharing or optimal intertemporal smoothing, recent work in empir-
ical open economy macroeconomics has tried estimation either of possibly incomplete
risksharing, or of possibly incomplete intertemporal smoothing.
This paper develops a method to estimate a possibly incomplete degree of in-
tertemporal consumption smoothing and a possibly incomplete degree of risksharing
jointly, consistently with the theories of risksharing and intertemporal consumption
smoothing. This method improves upon past risksharing work featuring extreme as-
sumptions on intertemporal consumption smoothing, as well as on studies that focus
only on intertemporal consumption smoothing. In addition, the paper provides some
foundations and limitations of empirical anal y s e so nc h a n n e l so fr i s k s h a r i n ga n dc o n -
sumption smoothing, and suggests a theoretically sounder estimation method as a
foundation of the channel literature. The two suggested empirical methods are com-
plementary. By applying both frameworks to US states, OECD and EU countries,
we try to draw a robust conclusion on the degree of risksharing and intertemporal
consumption smoothing both across countries and within a country.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. First, even after allowing for the possibility
of partial intertemporal consumption smoothing, the degree of risksharing within a
country is larger than across countries, in line with the ﬁndings of past studies. Al-
though methods with diﬀerent assumptions on the degree of intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing provide diﬀerent estimates for the degree of risksharing in the US
states and OECD (EU) countries, all methods predict a higher degree of risksharing
in the US states than in the OECD (EU) countries. Second, the degree of intertem-
poral consumption smoothing within a country is also larger than across countries.
Although channel studies often found the opposite, such results may have been ob-
tained as a consequence of improperly measuring the degree of risksharing, and of
overlooking the importance for intertemporal consumption smoothing of the diﬀer-
ence between permanent income and current income changes.
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